Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
O ne way of relieving the economic pressures created by an aging population would be to encourage workers to delay retirement. As society grows older, there is increasing concern about the ability of workers to pay enough taxes to support future retirees and other government functions. Over the next 50 years, for example, the number of Social Security benefi ciaries per 100 workers will rise from 30 to 50, assuming current employment patterns persist (Board of Trustees, 2006) . Older Americans could limit the impact of these demographic trends by working longer. People who work an extra year produce goods and services that can support their own current consumption and help cover the costs of retirement programs and other government efforts.
Enticing workers to delay retirement depends crucially on the individual returns to work at older ages. As work pays more, in terms of current after-tax earnings and increments to future retirement benefi ts, people may become increasingly willing to sacrifi ce leisure and remain at work to obtain richer consumption opportunities both today and later in retirement.
1 Rising tax rates can discourage work by reducing the share of output that workers take home. Earnings at older ages can be taxed in the traditional way, with payments to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or they can be "taxed" through reductions in future Social Security and other retirement benefi ts.
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The complex interaction between wages, benefi ts, and taxes determines how much work pays at older ages. Working an additional year will generally increase future Social Security benefits, for example, but the relationship between work history and Social Security is complex, and sometimes depends on the spouse's employment. Those who have earned much less over their lifetimes than their spouses might not gain any Social Security benefi ts from an additional year of work, because they receive benefi ts based solely on their spouses' earnings. In addition, many traditional defined benefit (DB) plans penalize those who continue on the job after they qualify for full retirement benefi ts, reducing the lifetime benefi ts they receive from the plan. Many workers receive valuable health benefi ts from their employers, and the loss of these benefi ts when they retire can provide strong incentives to remain on the job before they qualify for Medicare benefi ts at age 65.
This article describes the combined impact of Social Security, Medicare, employee benefi ts, and the tax system on the fi nancial incentive to work for representative adults age 55 and older. We compute the implicit tax rate on work, broadly defi ned to include standard income and payroll taxes as well as changes in future Social Security benefi ts, employer-provided pension benefi ts, and health benefi ts associated with an additional year of employment. We measure how work incentives vary by life expectancy, Social Security take-up age, pension plan type and contributions, earnings level, access to employer-sponsored health insurance and retiree health benefi ts, health status, and marital status. We also examine how selected policy reforms, such as eliminating the payroll tax and the taxation of Social Security benefi ts, could improve work incentives at older ages. Although previous research has examined how Social Security, employer pensions, employer health benefi ts, and taxes individually discourage work at older ages, this article is the fi rst effort to measure the combined impact of these various disincentives and to express them as a tax rate. For example, most studies of how Social Security and pensions affect retirement decisions have ignored the role of taxes and Medicare (e.g., Coile and Gruber (2004) , Friedberg and Webb (2005) , Samwick (1998) ).
SOCIAL SECURITY, TAXES, AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
The provisions of Social Security, tax law, and employer benefi t policies infl uence the returns to work at older ages. The rules are complex, however, and the impact varies by age, income, and marital status.
Social Security
Social Security benefi ts depend on the employment and earnings history of both the benefi ciary and spouse. Individuals qualify for future benefi ts based on their own earnings once they accumulate 40 quarters of covered employment. Benefi ts are calculated in three steps, beginning with the computation of average wage-indexed monthly earnings (AIME) from the highest 35 years of indexed earnings. The second step uses AIME to compute the primary insurance amount (PIA), the monthly benefi t payable at the normal retirement age (NRA). The benefi t formula is progressive, providing a higher PIA as a share of lifetime earnings for those with low lifetime earnings than for those with high lifetime earnings. The last step computes the actual Social Security benefi t by applying actuarial adjustment factors to the PIA depending on the age of benefi t take-up. Social Security reduces payments for those who collect benefi ts before the NRA and increases benefi ts for those who do not begin collecting until after the NRA, because delaying retirement reduces the number of monthly payments received.
Social Security also pays auxiliary benefi ts to eligible spouses, divorced spouses, and survivors of retired workers, based on the current or former spouse's earnings. Unless reduced for early retirement, benefi ts paid to current and divorced spouses equal one-half of the (ex)-spouse's PIA and benefi ts paid to survivors equal the deceased spouse's full PIA. Auxiliary benefi ts are then reduced by the amount of benefi ts one receives as a retired worker.
The impact of an additional year of work on future Social Security benefi ts depends on one's own earnings history, the spouse's earnings history, and the age one chooses to begin collecting benefi ts. Because AIME is based on a worker's highest 35 years of earnings, working an extra year will not raise future Social Security benefi ts unless current earnings exceed adjusted earnings in the least remunerative of the 35 years already used in the computation. In addition, those with substantially lower lifetime earnings than their spouses receive benefi ts based on their partners' earnings histories, and gain no additional Social Security benefi ts from work.
Delaying benefi t take-up increases the size of the monthly Social Security check for benefi ciaries, up to age 70. A worker born in 1950 (who faces an NRA of 66) would receive monthly Social Security payments equal to only 75 percent of her PIA if she claimed benefi ts at age 62, the earliest possible age (see Table 1 ). But she would receive 132 percent of her PIA if she delayed claiming benefi ts until age 70. (Delaying take-up beyond age 70 does not lead to any additional increases in benefi ts.) Thus, those who postpone collecting benefi ts until they leave the labor force will raise the value of their monthly benefi t checks by working an extra year, but they also reduce the number of lifetime payments they receive. The optimal take-up age depends in part on mortality expectations: Those who reach quite advanced ages will gain more from claiming later than those who die earlier. Evidence shows that many people could raise the value of their lifetime Social Security benefi ts by claiming at older ages (Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten, 2002) .
Taxes
Earnings are subject to both payroll and income taxes. Workers and their employers each pay a fl at Social Security tax equal to 6.2 percent of earnings and a fl at Medicare tax equal to 1.45 percent of earnings. Earnings above a specifi ed level are exempt from Social Security taxes but not Medicare taxes. The taxable ceiling, which rises each year by the percentage change in the average economy-wide wage, is $94,200 in 2006. Although employers nominally pay half of the payroll tax, most economists believe that employers offset their share of the tax bill by reducing wages below the level they would have paid in the absence of the payroll tax. Thus, workers ultimately pay the entire payroll tax themselves, and we include employer contributions in our measure of the implicit tax rate. Workers also pay federal and state income tax on their earnings and some of their retirement benefi ts.
2 The federal income tax is progressive, exempting from taxation the fi rst $16,900 of income in 2006 for married couples. Marginal tax rates in 2006 range from a low of ten percent, for those with limited incomes, to a top rate of 35 percent for high-income taxpayers. Social Security benefi ts are generally not subject to the federal income tax, except for high-income benefi ciaries, particularly those who continue to work or receive generous pension benefi ts. If adjusted gross income (AGI) plus tax-exempt interest income and one-half of Social Security benefi ts ("modifi ed AGI") fall below $25,000 for single taxpayers or $32,000 for couples, benefi ciaries pay no federal income taxes on their Social Security. However, up to 50 percent of Social Security income is taxable for single taxpayers with modifi ed AGI between $25,000 and $34,000 (or between $32,000 and $44,000 for couples). Up to 85 percent of Social Security income is taxable for single taxpayers with modifi ed AGI over $34,000 (or $44,000 for couples). These income thresholds are fi xed, and do not grow with wages or prices. As wages and Social Security benefi ts increase over time with prices and productivity, a growing share of benefi ciaries will pay taxes on their Social Security benefi ts.
Employee Benefi ts
Employers typically offer their workers nonwage benefi ts, principally health insurance and pension plans. These benefi ts often infl uence the returns to work.
Health Benefi ts
Almost two-thirds of employers offered health insurance benefi ts to their workers in 2004, at an average per worker monthly cost of about $300 for single coverage (Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, 2004) . The average cost is higher for older workers, because they tend to use more health services than younger workers. Most employees who choose to participate in employer-sponsored health plans must make explicit contributions to offset part of the cost. The average monthly contribution in 2004 for single coverage reached nearly $50. The share of health insurance costs that workers explicitly pay themselves is of less economic relevance here, however, because workers generally pay the entire cost of their health benefi ts, either explicitly or implicitly in the form of lower wages. Basic economic theory predicts that employers in competitive labor markets pay compensation equal to workers' productivity, and payments in the form of health benefi ts and other types of nonwage compensation are offset by lower wages. Although anti-discrimination laws forbid fi rms from charging older workers higher contributions than younger workers, employers may compensate for the high cost of providing health benefi ts to older workers by limiting wage growth at older ages.
Perhaps most importantly, employer health benefi ts grant workers access to group insurance plans. Nongroup insurance policies typically charge higher premiums than group policies because nongroup plans face high administrative expenses and tend to attract intensive users of health services, who gain the most from health insurance. Insurance companies often try to deter high-cost policyholders by charging higher premiums to those with pre-existing health problems or denying them coverage altogether, for even relatively minor health conditions (Chollet and Kirk, 1998) . 3 The group market is especially advantageous to workers with health problems, because it is illegal for employers to deny them coverage or require them to make higher contributions than workers in good health.
Workers with employer health insurance generally forfeit their benefi ts when they retire, and the loss of access to the group insurance market raises the cost of retiring before age 65. At 65, however, virtually all Americans qualify for Medicare benefi ts, eliminating the need to obtain primary coverage in the nongroup market. Some employers offer retiree health benefi ts to their workers, enabling them to continue their employer health insurance coverage after they retire until they qualify for Medicare benefi ts at age 65. Some retiree health plans also supplement Medicare benefi ts after age 65. Workers with retiree health benefi ts do not lose access to the group market if they leave the labor force before qualifying for Medicare. Consequently, retiree health benefi ts reduce incentives to work.
Workers with employer-sponsored health coverage forfeit their Medicare benefits when they remain on the job beyond age 65. Federal law mandates that employer-sponsored health insurance be the primary payer of medical expenses for active workers ages 65 and older. Medicare becomes secondary coverage, paying only for Medicare-covered services not included in the employer benefi ts package.
Pension Plans
About one-half of full-time workers participate in employer-sponsored pension plans (Copeland, 2002) . There are two general types of pensions: defi ned contribution (DC) plans and traditional DB plans. In DC plans, which include 401(k) plans and are now the most common type of retirement benefit, employers (and generally employees) make tax-deferred contributions to a retirement account in the participant's name, often specifi ed as a particular share of salary or a given dollar amount. At retirement, workers receive the funds that have accumulated in their accounts. They can use these funds to purchase annuities, although few do (Johnson, Burman, and Kobes, 2004) . Income from DC accounts is taxable upon withdrawal. Workers face tax penalties if they withdraw funds before age 59 and one-half, but penalties are waived if they receive benefi ts as annuities.
Traditional DB plans provide workers with lifetime annuities that begin at retirement and pay benefits typically expressed as a multiple of years of service and earnings received near the end of the career (e.g., one percent of average salary over the fi nal three years on the job times years of service). Participants cannot collect benefi ts until they reach the plan's retirement age. Some plans allow workers to collect reduced benefi ts at specifi ed early retirement ages. Income from DB plans is not taxable until it is received in retirement.
Pension wealth-the present discounted value of the stream of future expected benefi ts-tends to grow slowly in DB plans for young workers, increases rapidly at older ages once workers approach the plan's retirement age, and often declines if the worker remains on the job past the retirement age. Pension wealth is minimal at younger ages because junior employees typically earn low wages and have completed only a few years of service. In addition, future benefi ts are discounted many years into the future. Wealth rises rapidly as workers age and accumulate tenure.
An additional year on the job increases traditional pension benefi ts not only by adding an additional percentage of pay, but also by raising the value of previous benefi t accruals by a combination of real wage growth and infl ation. This increment is often substantial for workers with lengthy job tenures. Pension wealth also increases as workers approach retirement age and benefi ts are no longer discounted far into the future.
Workers in traditional DB plans often lose pension wealth if they stay on the job beyond a certain age or seniority level. Growth in promised annual retirement benefi ts slows at older ages as wage growth declines. Some plans also cap the number of years of service that workers can credit toward their pensions, and others cap the share of pre-retirement earnings that the plan will replace in retirement. In addition, for every year that workers remain on the job past the plan's retirement age, they forego a year of benefi ts. Pension wealth declines when the increase in annual benefi ts from an additional year of work is insuffi cient to offset the loss from the reduction in the number of pension installments.
Pension wealth in DC plans, which simply equals the value of the account balance, grows each year by the value of employee and employer contributions to the plan and by the investment returns earned on the account balance. Although sharp changes in investment returns can lead to discontinuities in DC plan wealth, it does not systematically increase prior to the retirement age or fall thereafter.
Previous Literature
Although numerous studies have examined how our system of taxes and transfers affects work incentives, previous research has not measured the combined impact of Social Security, taxes, and employee benefi ts on the returns to work at older ages. Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sluchynsky (2002) , for example, compare lifetime earnings for a representative two-earner couple to lifetime taxes and the lifetime value of transfer payments they lose because of work, and conclude that workers give up nearly 50 cents in tax payments and foregone transfers for every dollar they earn. The authors do not, however, examine returns to work at older ages, or how returns vary with age. A number of studies have investigated the impact of financial incentives on retirement behavior, especially the role of Social Security and employer-sponsored pension and health plans (Coile and Gruber, 2004; Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese, 2003; Wise, 1992, 1994; Samwick, 1998; Stock and Wise, 1990) . These studies ignore the role of taxes and (generally) Medicare, and do not report how total returns to work change as adults age. Our approach is similar to the analysis of Diamond and Gruber (1999), who compute implicit tax rates for prototypical workers, but they ignore the role of federal income taxes and employer-sponsored pension and health insurance plans, which have important effects on work incentives.
METHODS
We defi ne the tax on earnings as the difference between the amount of compensation employers pay and the total value of wages and nonwage benefi ts that workers take home. The implicit tax rate T at age t can be expressed as:
where C t is total compensation at age t, EP t is the payroll tax paid by the employer, WP t is the payroll tax paid by the employee, F t is federal income tax, L t is the marginal accrual at age t in lifetime federal
The Implicit Tax on Work at Older Ages 217 income taxes on future Social Security and pension benefi ts, M t is the loss of Medicare benefi ts from working at age t, SS t is the marginal accrual in Social Security wealth from working at age t, and H t is the savings from group health insurance at age t. Total compensation consists of cash earnings plus the employer's share of payroll taxes and health insurance premiums. For workers in DC plans, total compensation includes the employer's contribution to the plan. For those in DB plans, total compensation includes the change in lifetime pension wealth.
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The fi rst term in equation [1] , the ratio of payroll and federal income taxes to total compensation, is the standard measure of the federal tax rate, which we adjust to account for the impact of changes in net Social Security wealth and health insurance costs. The computation reduces the tax by the increase in the present discounted value (PDV) of future Social Security benefi ts associated with an additional year of work (SS t ), but raises the tax measure by the PDV of future federal income taxes that will be paid on Social Security and pension benefits (L t ). We increase the tax measure for workers with employer health insurance by the value of Medicare benefi ts lost each year after age 65 (M t ), because Medicare-eligible workers with employer health benefi ts must forego Medicare when they remain at work.
5 Finally, workers with employer health insurance coverage can obtain less expensive health benefi ts than those forced to turn to the costly and ineffi cient nongroup market. We reduce taxes for workers with employer health benefi ts by the value of the savings they realize in the group insurance market (H t ). We view increments to Social Security wealth, loss of Medicare benefi ts, and savings from access to group insurance as taxes (either positive or negative) because they alter net compensation without changing employer payments.
We compute implicit tax rates for prototypical adults at each age between 55 and 70. The calculations for any given age assume that workers retire at the end of the year and begin collecting retirement benefi ts the next year, if eligible. If too young to collect benefi ts when they retire, they begin collecting as soon as they qualify. They always take up Social Security by age 70, even if they are still working, because there is no gain from postponing beyond age 70. The analysis assumes a personal discount rate of two percent, and an inflation rate of three percent. We report all fi nancial amounts in constant 2004 dollars.
We focus on a base case, defi ned as a man born in 1950 (and, thus, 55 years old in 2005), in good health and subject to average mortality risks for his birth cohort. To avoid having to make assumptions about spousal earnings, we assume that our base case worker is unmarried. He has worked continuously since age 22, earns moderate wages (typical of a man with some post-secondary education but less than four years of college), has employer-sponsored health insurance but is not entitled to retiree health benefi ts, and has participated in a DC plan since age 35. Like others born in 1950, he can fi rst collect full Social Security benefi ts at age 66 and reduced benefi ts at age 62.
The base case assumes the employer contributes eight percent of earnings each year to the DC plan and the worker contributes nothing. The account balance earns interest at the nominal rate of fi ve percent per year. The worker takes an actuarially fair single-life annuity at retire-ment, based on a real interest rate of two percent, but his benefi ts are not indexed to infl ation. We assume that benefi ts are fully subject to the federal income tax when he retires. 6 The base-case worker does not save outside of Social Security or his employer's retirement plan.
To examine the sensitivity of our fi ndings, we also compute returns to work for other prototypes, which vary by earnings, pension plan type and contributions, life expectancy, Social Security take-up age, marital status, access to employer-sponsored health insurance and retiree health benefi ts, and health status. One of the alternative pension scenarios assumes that the worker contributes eight percent of his salary to the DC plan, in addition to the employer contributions. Other pension scenarios consider a worker in a traditional DB plan that pays retirement benefi ts equal to one percent of average salary received during the fi nal three years on the job times years of service, with full benefi ts payable beginning at age 62. One variant includes an early retirement option that pays reduced benefi ts as early as age 55, as long as participants have completed 25 years of service. 7 We assume that the worker joins the fi rm at age 35. The data appendix provides additional details about the measures.
The analysis concludes with simulations of the impact of potential policy reforms on the implicit tax on work at older ages. For our base-case worker, we model the impact of the elimination of the income tax on Social Security benefi ts, the elimination of the payroll tax (for both Social Security and Medicare) after the NRA, and the designation of Medicare as the primary payer of health care costs for eligible benefi ciaries regardless of work status. We also model the impact of implementing all three reforms together.
ESTIMATED TAX ON WORK AT OLDER AGES
Before examining how our comprehensive tax rate measure changes with age for our representative worker, we consider how federal income taxes and employee payroll taxes alone relate to earnings at older ages (see Table 2 ). Column 1 reports taxable earnings, which fall slowly with age in real terms because the steady but modest nominal-wage increases experienced by our base-case worker fail to keep pace with infl ation. As a result, he earns $12,000 less in real terms at age 70 than at age 55. Column 2 reports employee payroll taxes, set at 7.65 percent of earnings, and column 3 reports federal income taxes. At age 55, our representative worker pays 22.8 percent of his earnings to payroll and federal income taxes (column 6). At age 61 (in 2011), his direct tax rate increases to 23.7 percent, primarily because of the expiration of the 2001-3 tax cuts after 2010. The tax rate then falls slowly as his real earnings decline. Our assumption that workers take up Social Security benefi ts at age 70 (because they gain nothing from further delay) increases their current federal income tax liabilities, pushing the direct tax rate on work at age 70 to nearly 40 percent.
This simple measure of the tax on work, which is the rate that most workers probably perceive, is incomplete because it ignores employer pension and health benefi ts, the employer share of the payroll tax, and the impact of continued employment on Social Security and Medicare benefi ts. Table 3 shows how our broader measure of the implicit tax rate on work changes with age. The table reports total compensation (column 5) and its components, the total tax on work (column 13) and its components, and the implicit tax rate (column 14).
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A portion of the benefi ts would not be taxable if the worker made after-tax contributions to the plan, but most workers contribute only before-tax dollars.
Employer contributions to heath insurance and the pension plan and the employer's share of payroll taxes raise total compensation for our base-case worker. The share of total compensation paid in the form of cash wages falls steadily with age because employers contribute more in health insurance premiums for older workers than younger workers. At age 55, total compensation exceeds wages by 23 percent, and non-cash compensation is divided fairly evenly among employer payroll taxes, health insurance contributions, and pension contributions. At age 70, by contrast, compensation exceeds wages by 36 percent, with health insurance contributions accounting for more than half of all non-cash compensation. Because of rising health insurance contributions, real total compensation falls more slowly with age than real cash earnings.
Changes in Social Security wealth substantially alter the implicit tax rate over time. Through his mid 50s, Social Security wealth for our base-case individual grows rapidly with additional work. Each added year of employment replaces a year of zero earnings in the Social Security formula, substantially increasing future benefi ts. By age 57, however, our base-case worker-who has worked continuously since age 22-has accumulated 35 years of covered employment, the maximum number of years in the benefi ts formula. Each additional year of employment increases future benefi ts only by the amount that earnings in the current year exceed indexed earnings in the least remunerative year. As a result, the real increment to Social Security wealth from an added year of employment declines from $5,367 at age 56 to $1,887 at age 57. It continues to fall through age 61.
From ages 62 to 69, Social Security raises monthly payments for those who delay claiming benefi ts to compensate them for the reduction in the number of lifetime payments they will receive. As a result, our representative individual can generally raise his Social Security wealth by working an additional year at ages 62 to 66. The increases in monthly payments, however, are insuffi cient to fully compensate single men who delay benefi t take-up 
Source: Authors' computations. Note: Estimates are based on a representative unmarried male worker in good health with a DC pension plan and no retiree health insurance. Computations for any given age assume that workers retire at the end of the year and begin collecting retirement benefi ts the next year, if eligible. Financial amounts are expressed in constant 2004 dollars.
at ages 67 to 69. Although the adjustments are designed to be actuarially fair across the entire population, raising monthly payments just enough to offset exactly the reduction in the number of lifetime payments, they are not fair for single men, who have higher mortality rates than women. The loss of Social Security wealth increases the implicit tax rate on work by a few percentage points for single men in their late 60s. Even while our representative worker is in his mid 50s and Social Security wealth is growing, the increment to wealth falls short of the Social Security portion of his payroll taxes. The worker and his employer each pays 6.2 percent of cash wages to Social Security, amounting to $6,324 in annual payments when he is 55.
(Column 6 in Table 3 shows total payroll taxes, including the portion that fi nances Medicare, not Social Security payroll taxes alone.) These tax payments are nearly $800 more than the increment to his Social Security wealth. At age 69, when he loses more than $4,300 in Social Security wealth by remaining at work, he pays more than $4,900 in annual Social Security taxes.
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Future income tax liabilities offset part of any increase in future retirement benefi ts associated with an additional year of work. As shown in column 9, increments to the PDV of lifetime federal tax liabilities are quite small between ages 55 and 61 because his annual pension and (future) Social Security income would be modest and taxed only lightly if he stopped working at a relatively young age. Each additional year of work would raise future retirement income and, thus, future tax liabilities because of the progressivity of the tax code. For example, working an additional year at age 66 would raise the PDV of future income taxes by $3,403.
Employer health insurance coverage reduces the implicit tax workers pay before age 65, but raises it once they would otherwise qualify for Medicare coverage. Employer coverage allows workers to avoid the inefficient nongroup insurance market, where coverage is about 20 percent more expensive than in the group market. We estimate that access to the group insurance market saves our base-case worker in good health about $1,000 per year at age 55, reducing the implicit tax rate by 1.7 percentage points. Cost savings rise with age as expected health services use increases, reaching nearly $1,500 per year at age 64. These savings lower the implicit tax rate by 2.7 percentage points. Beginning at age 65, however, employer-sponsored coverage forces the worker to forfeit Medicare benefi ts. The annual value of these lost benefi ts amounts to $5,178 at age 65, increasing the implicit tax rate on work by 9.4 percentage points, and rises by age 70 to $7,680, equal to 14.5 percent of total compensation.
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The total implicit tax rate grows rapidly with age. At age 55, the implicit tax rate stands at only 14.2 percent, much less than the 22.8 percent rate reported in Table  2 that most workers probably perceive themselves as paying. The implicit rate is relatively low at age 55 because our worker reaps tax bonuses from his growing Social Security wealth and savings from access to the group insurance market. The implicit tax rate grows to 21.7 percent by age 60 and to 23.9 percent by age 64, as the increment to Social Security wealth slows. With the loss of Medicare benefi ts, the tax rate soars to 39.4 percent by age 65, and generally increases thereafter, reaching 47.5 percent at age 69. Our assumption that workers take up Social Security ben-8 These comparisons do not necessarily imply that Social Security is a bad deal for our representative worker, however. Early in his career, the increment in Social Security wealth far exceeds his annual Social Security payroll taxes. Over his lifetime, he could receive more from Social Security than he puts in. 9 Note that the value of employer health insurance contributions slightly exceeds the loss in Medicare benefi ts at every age because the employer plan that our base-case worker receives is somewhat more generous than Medicare.
efi ts at age 70 (because they gain nothing by delaying further) increases their current federal income tax liability, pushing the implicit tax rate on work at age 70 to nearly 50 percent. High tax rates may provide strong disincentives to work at older ages. In combination with declining real wages, rising tax rates on work cut real net compensation for our base-case worker approximately in half between ages 55 and 70. However, previous studies give mixed results on the impact on work. On the one hand, overall male labor supply may not be very responsive to the net wage. A recent review fi nds that across about 20 studies, the median estimate of own wage labor supply elasticity was only 0.08 for men (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) . This elasticity implies that the cumulative work disincentives between ages 55 and 70 reduce male labor supply by only about four percent. On the other hand, retirement decisions appear to be more responsive to changes in net compensation. Gustman and Steinmeier's (2001/2002) estimates of the impact of changes in Social Security and pension wealth on work decisions imply an elasticity of about 0.42. This elasticity suggests that the implicit tax on work at age 70 increases retirement rates about 21 percent, relative to what they would be if age-70 work were instead taxed at the same rate as age-50 work. In truth, workers may respond as a group to social and tax signals-e.g., tending to retire if their friends retire-a type of effect that cannot easily be captured in simple comparisons of individual responses to tax rates.
ESTIMATED TAX RATES FOR ALTERNATIVE WORKERS
To test the sensitivity of our estimated work incentives to the characteristics of our base-case worker, we measure the returns to work for typical workers who differ from our base case by earnings, pension plan, life expectancy, Social Security take-up age, marital status, access to retiree and employer-sponsored health insurance, and health status. In each case, we vary only one characteristic of the worker, holding all others constant. Although particular rates vary, our basic result remains the same throughout: Tax rates increase with additional years of work. Table 4 shows how the implicit tax on work varies by earnings. Our base-case worker, who earns moderate wages, receives annual earnings of $50,996 at age 55 (in 2004 dollars), typical for a man with some post-secondary education (but less than four years of college). At the same age, a typical male worker with less than a high-school degree earns only $29,502 (our low-wage scenario), and another with a college education earns $75,066 (our high-wage scenario). The implicit tax rate through age 64 increases with earnings because of the progressivity in the federal income tax code and the Social Security benefi t formula, which disproportionately raises the accrual in Social Security wealth for those with limited earnings. At age 55, for example, our high-wage earner faces an implicit tax rate of 22.7 percent, compared with only 8.5 percent for our low-wage earner. Tax-rate differences by earnings are muted after age 65, however, because workers at all earnings levels face the same absolute loss of Medicare benefi t by remaining employed, and the loss is larger relative to earnings for those near the bottom of the earnings distribution. Table 5 reports the impact of alternative pension plans on implicit tax rates for our representative worker. Because employer-sponsored pension plans provide tax-deferred compensation, he Source: Authors' estimates. Note: The base-case worker is an unmarried man in good health who has been working for the current employer since age 35. He earns moderate wages and has a DC pension plan into which his employer contributes 8% of his salary, but he makes no contributions. Other cases are identical to the base case except for the pension plan. The DB plans pay full benefi ts equal to 1% of fi nal three years of earnings times years of service beginning at age 62. The early retirement option pays benefi ts as early as age 55 after 25 years of service. Computations for any given age assume that workers retire at the end of the year and begin collecting retirement benefi ts the next year, if eligible. faces higher tax rates on work before age 62 when his employer does not offer a plan (column 2) than when the employer offers a DC plan (column 1). However, each additional year of participation in a pension plan increases future federal tax liabilities, because pension funds are taxable when they are withdrawn. Increases in pension income can also raise the share of Social Security benefi ts subject to federal taxation. As plan participants work beyond age 61 and accumulate signifi cant pension income, their future tax payments outweigh the advantages of tax-deferred compensation. As a result, they face higher implicit tax rates on work after age 61 than those without any pension plans.
Earnings
Pension Plans
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Employee contributions to the DC plan increase tax rates on work at older ages. Column 3 of Table 5 reports implicit tax rates for our representative worker when he contributes eight percent of his gross earnings to his retirement plan, tax deferred, in addition to his employer's contributions. (In the base case, only the employer contributes to the plan.) Taxdeferred DC plan contributions lower his federal income taxes while he works, but the relatively high pension benefi ts he receives in retirement increase the tax burden by even more when he stops working. As a result, the implicit tax rate on work is as many as seven percentage points higher for the DC plan contributor than the DC plan participant who does not contribute (and simply spends his earnings when he receives them).
DB pension plans often lower the returns to work at older ages, because plan participants generally lose pension wealth if they remain on the job beyond the plan's normal retirement age. Figure 1 shows the annual increment to real pension wealth 10 Our representative worker does benefi t from the tax-deferred savings vehicle. However, once the account balance is large enough, the plan raises his implicit tax rate on work above that faced by someone else without a 401(k) plan who receives the same cash wage (and, thus, receives less total compensation.)
Figure 1. Increment to Pension Wealth, by Plan Type
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from an additional year of work for our base-case worker, who participates in a DC plan, and for an otherwise identical worker who participates in a DB plan with an early retirement option that pays full benefi ts equal to one percent of fi nal average salary times years of service. Our representative worker qualifi es for full benefi ts at age 62 and reduced benefi ts at age 60 (after 25 years of service). Real pension wealth in the DC plan grows steadily over time, increasing more slowly at older ages as real earnings decline. The pattern is much more erratic for the DB plan. The annual increment to DB wealth is about $10,000 when the worker is in his late 50s, and then spikes upward to $30,000 at age 60, when he qualifi es for early retirement benefi ts. The annual wealth increment falls to $2,500 at age 61, and for every year he remains on the job after age 62 he loses about $10,000 in pension wealth. The implicit tax rate faced by our DB plan participant drops sharply at age 59 as his pension wealth spikes, but rises above the rate faced by the DC plan participant in later years (see column 4 in Table 5 ). From ages 60 to 62, for example, the DB plan participant faces a tax rate of about 30 percent because the slow growth or loss of pension wealth reduces his compensation. His tax rate jumps to 46 percent at age 65 and to 61 percent at age 70. The loss of DB pension wealth substantially increases the tax on work at older ages, and helps explain why workers in DB plans tend to retire earlier than those in DC plans (Friedberg and Webb, 2005) .
Column 5 reports implicit tax rates on work for a DB plan without an early retirement option. The presence of the early retirement option sharply decreases the tax on work just before the early retirement age, when pension wealth spikes, but increases the tax rate in the years between the early and normal retirement ages, when the growth in pension wealth is relatively small.
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Life Expectancy Table 6 shows how the implicit tax rate on work varies by life expectancy, Social Security take-up age, marital status, access to health insurance, and health status. For our alternative life-expectancy case, we use average female mortality rates for the 1950 birth cohort, instead of average male rates. Women born in 1950 who survive to age 55 can expect to live 3.2 years longer than men (Bell and Miller, 2002) . Mortality rates affect Social Security wealth, annual pension income, and annual income taxes paid in retirement. Although the increase in life expectancy does not change the monthly Social Security benefi t, it increases Social Security wealth by raising the expected number of payments. Pension wealth is identical in each scenario, because employers contribute the same eight percent of earnings each year to the DC plans. However, the annuity that each individual purchases with DC plan assets is based on sex-specifi c survival probabilities, and we assume that insurance companies can identify the retiree with relatively high life expectancy as a woman. Consequently, the high-life-expectancy person receives lower annual pension income and faces lower income taxes in retirement than the base-case. The gain in Social Security wealth and the decrease in lifetime federal taxes lowers the implicit tax rate for the worker with high life expectancy by as many as seven percentage points below the rate faced by the single man with average life expectancy. Source: Authors' estimates. Note: Computations for any given age assume that workers retire at the end of the year and begin collecting retirement benefi ts the next year, if eligible. The base-case worker is an unmarried man in good health, earns moderate wages, and has a DC pension plan and employer-sponsored health insurance, but no retiree health insurance. He does not takes up Social Security benefi ts until he stops working, but no later than age 70. Other cases are identical to the base case except for the specifi ed characteristic.
Social Security Take-Up Age
The timing of Social Security benefi t take-up affects the size of both current and future benefi ts, up to age 70. Here we compare our base-case worker who waits to take up Social Security benefi ts until he stops working (but not later than age 70) with an average-life-expectancy man and a high-life-expectancy man who take up Social Security benefi ts by age 65 even if they remain at work (see columns 3 and 4). As reported earlier in Table 1 , claiming at age 65 reduces monthly benefi ts by 29 percent compared with claiming at age 70. However, the impact on Social Security wealth is more complicated. Although those who claim Social Security benefi ts at age 65 while they are still working receive lower annual benefi ts than those who wait to claim, they will receive more payments over their lifetimes. Claiming benefi ts by age 65 instead of age 70 also raises income tax liabilities while working because taxable income includes both earnings and some portion of Social Security benefi ts. Once early claimants stop working, however, they pay lower income taxes than those who claim later, because their Social Security benefi ts will be lower.
Claiming benefits by age 65 instead of by age 70 raises the implicit tax rate on work at ages 65 to 68 for men with average life expectancies, because current tax liabilities soar. At ages 69 and 70, however, single employed men can lower their implicit tax rates on work by taking up benefi ts at age 65. Single men lose thousands of dollars in Social Security wealth if they do not claim benefi ts at age 69, and 70-year-old workers pay higher taxes if they take up benefi ts at age 70 than if they fi rst receive them at age 65, because annual benefi t payments are much larger for those who delay.
Single workers with relatively high life expectancies are always better off by waiting to claim, up to age 69, instead of taking up benefi ts at age 65. They gain more from the monthly benefi t increases that Social Security provides to those who delay claiming beyond the NRA. At age 70, however, high-life-expectancy workers who wait to claim benefi ts face higher implicit tax rates on work than those who claim at age 65 because their relatively high benefi t payments increase their marginal income tax rates. Table 6 also reports the impact of marital status on the costs and benefi ts of additional work. We compare our representative unmarried man to another man identical in all respects except that he is married to a woman of the same age. We fi rst assume that his wife does not work. In the tax rate calculation, marriage affects only federal income taxes and Social Security benefi ts. The tax system provides a marriage bonus to this particular couple, which pays lower taxes than our base-case worker simply because they are married. The married couple also benefi ts from the Social Security auxiliary spouse benefi t. At age 62, the wife becomes entitled to spouse benefi ts based on her husband's earnings, even though she has never worked. 12 The combination of lower income taxes and a larger Social Security accrual lowers the implicit tax rate for the married worker with a nonworking spouse below the rate faced by our base-case single worker, through age 65.
Marital Status
Implicit tax rates are signifi cantly higher, however, for a married man whose wife works. We assume that the wife has the same earnings stream as the husband, and that she stops work and starts collecting Social Security and pension benefi ts at age 62. We treat the husband as the marginal worker and measure the work incentives that he faces assuming that his wife's labor supply is fi xed. Under these assumptions, his implicit tax rate is substantially higher than those for unmarried men and men married to women who do not work. From ages 55 to 63, the husband with the working wife pays higher income taxes and accrues less Social Security wealth with each additional year of employment than other workers because of the progressivity of the tax code and the Social Security system.
Retiree Health Insurance Benefi ts
The availability of retiree health benefi ts reduces incentives to work before age 65. Workers at fi rms that offer retiree health benefi ts retain access to the group insurance market even if they retire before qualifying for Medicare benefi ts. Because they do not need to stay employed to avoid the ineffi cient nongroup market, the savings from access to the group market does not reduce the implicit tax they face on employment. Granting our representative worker access to retiree health benefi ts raises the tax on work by about two percentage points above the rate faced by our base-case worker, who loses his employer-sponsored coverage when he retires. The increase in the tax rate reduces incentives to work. In fact, workers with access to retiree health benefi ts generally retire earlier than other workers (Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese, 2003) .
The lack of any health insurance coverage from an employer reduces the implicit tax on work after age 65 because workers without employer-sponsored coverage do not forfeit Medicare benefi ts by remaining at work. At younger ages, however, they face higher implicit tax rates than workers with employer coverage because they do not gain the benefi ts of access to the group market by remaining in the labor force.
Health Status
The presence of health problems substantially raises returns to work for those with employer-sponsored heath benefi ts. Workers with health problems face lower implicit tax rates because continued employment generates large savings in health insurance premiums through access to the group insurance. If they retire before qualifying for Medicare coverage, their health problems would force them to pay exorbitant premiums for nongroup coverage, assuming they do not qualify for Medicare's disability benefi ts. Health status differences in implicit tax rates disappear at age 65, when Medicare eligibility begins. Although people with health problems face strong fi nancial incentives to work, they may be less productive and earn lower wages than those in good health. Table 7 reports the impact of potential policy reforms on the implicit tax on work at older ages, including eliminating the income tax on Social Security benefi ts, eliminating the payroll tax after Social Security's NRA, and designating Medicare as the primary payer of health care costs for eligible benefi ciaries regardless of work status. Each of these reforms would increase work incentives by lowering the implicit tax. Changing Medicare payment rules would have the largest impact, reducing the implicit tax on work at ages 65 and older by generally more than ten percentage points. For example, at age 68 the proposed Medicare reform would reduce the tax from 44.2 to 31.9 percent. Eliminating the payroll tax after the NRA would reduce the tax rate by about ten percentage points at ages 66 and older for our base-case worker, who qualifi es for full Social Security benefi ts at age 66. Eliminating the federal income tax on Social Security benefi ts would reduce the tax on work by about three to four percentage points at ages 62 and older. Exempting all Social Security benefi ts from the federal income tax would have no effect before age 61 because our base-case worker does not accumulate enough retirement wealth to make his Social Security benefi ts subject to the income tax under current law if he stops working at a young age. The impact would be largest at age 70, when all covered workers collect Social Security and the earnings of our base-case worker make more than half of his benefi ts taxable.
POLICY SIMULATIONS
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Combining all three reforms would cut the implicit tax on work at older ages by more than half. At age 68, for example, implementing these three reforms would reduce the tax rate for our base-case worker from 44.2 to 18.2 percent, a lower tax rate than he faces in his late 50s.
CONCLUSIONS
One way of relieving the economic pressures created by an aging population without cutting retirement benefi ts would be to encourage workers to delay retirement. Working longer increases the net output and productivity of the economy, generates additional payroll and income tax revenue, and reduces the average number of years in which people receive retirement benefi ts. As policymakers look for ways to discourage retirement, understanding the work incentives built into the current system of taxes and benefi ts becomes crucial.
This study shows that Social Security, federal taxes, and employee benefi ts create Source: Authors' estimates. Note: Estimates are for our base-case worker, defi ned as an unmarried man in good health who takes up Social Security benefi ts at age 62 or when he stops work (whichever comes later, but no later than age 70). He earns moderate wages and has a DC pension plan and employer-sponsored health insurance, but no retiree health insurance. Computations for any given age assume that workers retire at the end of the year. 13 As noted earlier, there is no gain from delaying Social Security take-up beyond age 70.
work disincentives for older adults. The implicit tax rate on work increases rapidly at older ages, nearly doubling between ages 55 and 64 for a typical male worker and more than doubling between ages 64 and 70. Implicit tax rates at older ages are especially high for workers in traditional DB pension plans and those married to working partners with similar earnings. A number of policy and economic changes in recent years appear to encourage work at older ages. These changes include the growth in DC plans and decline in DB plans, the erosion in retiree health insurance coverage, increases in Social Security's NRA, and reductions in the prevalence of Social Security auxiliary benefi ts as more married women work at relatively high wages. Existing changes, however, are probably insuffi cient. Additional options to encourage work at older ages include the creation of a payroll tax credit for older workers, who often pay much more in payroll taxes than they receive in incremental Social Security wealth. We estimate that eliminating the payroll tax for workers older than Social Security's NRA would reduce the implicit tax on work at older ages by about ten percentage points. This reform would not necessarily reduce total tax revenue because it could draw a substantial number of older workers into the labor market and lead to higher income tax revenue.
The elimination of the requirement that Medicare serve as the secondary payer for workers with employer-sponsored coverage could prove even more effective at encouraging work at older ages. The high cost of medical insurance for older workers discourages employers from retaining or hiring workers over age 65. Allowing Medicare to be the primary payer would lower employment costs and reduce the implicit tax rate faced by typical older workers by more than ten percentage points.
Reducing regulatory barriers to work at older ages could also be fruitful. There are many regulatory barriers that employers face that discourage phased retirement (e.g., the tax code, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [ERISA] , and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act [ADEA] ). These regulations prevent workers from collecting their DB pensions while continuing to work for the plan sponsor, forcing workers to either retire or lose substantial pension wealth. Addressing these regulations may encourage more fl exible work arrangements and continued work for older workers. Employers could also be given greater fl exibility in controlling their health costs when they hire older workers (Penner, Perun, and Steuerle, 2002) .
DATA APPENDIX
The analysis combines data from several sources to compute the implicit tax rate on work.
EARNINGS AND SOCIAL SECURITY
Annual earning histories, reported in Table  A1 , come from the Social Security Administration's Model of Income in the Near Term (MINT4). Earnings are based on the average of nonzero historical and projected earnings between ages 22 and 70 for male workers born in 1951 (Toder, Thompson, Favreault, Johnson, Perese, Ratcliffe, Smith, Uccello, Waidmann, Berk, Woldemariam, Burtless, Sahm, and Wolf, 2002) .
14 Low-wage earners are based on a sample of men who did not complete high school, moderate-wage earners are men who attended college but did not complete four years of study, and high-wage earners are men who completed four or more years of college. Based on these earnings, we compute Social Security benefi ts using a detailed calculator that incorporates the 2002 Social Security trustees' assumptions about future price and wage growth.
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PAYROLL AND FEDERAL INCOME TAXES
The analysis estimates federal payroll and income tax liabilities using the Urban-Brookings Tax 14 We use MINT4 earnings between ages 22 and 62 and assume that earnings after age 62 increase by one percent per year in nominal terms. In the few cases where earnings in MINT4 decline from one age to the next before 62, we smooth earnings growth between the years in which earnings increase. 15 Our Social Security estimates are based on the assumption that current-law benefi ts will be payable throughout the projection period. However, the Social Security actuaries project that the program's trust funds will be exhausted by 2040 and that benefi ts would need to be reduced immediately by 13.3 percent in order for the trust funds to remain solvent (Board of Trustees, 2006 
